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A, B, C

Deployment of Civilian Capacities to International Peace Operations

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Impresum

Publisher:

Belgrade Centre for Security Policy [BCSP]

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Design and layout:

DTP Studio, Belgrade

Printed by:

UNAGRAF d.o.o., Belgrade

Printing:

150 copies

Belgrade, 2016

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ISBN: 987-86-6237-124-9

CIP - Каталогизacija u publikaciji - Narodna biblioteka Srbije, Beograd

355.088:355.357

HADŽOVIĆ, Denis, 1966-

A, B, C - Deployment of Civilian Capacities to International Peace Operations / [author Denis Hadzovic]. - Belgrade : Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2016 (Belgrade : Unagraf). - 11 str. ; 25 cm

Tiraž 150. - Napomene i bibliografske reference uz tekst.

ISBN 978-86-6237-124-9

a) Мировне мисије - Цивили b) Мировне операције - Цивили

COBISS.SR-ID 222331660

A, B, C - Deployment of Civilian Capacities to International Peace Operations

Denis Hadžović

Introduction

After the end of the Cold War traditional peacekeeping has become more complex and multidimensional, including not only military but also civilian, political and humanitarian tasks.¹ The concept of peacekeeping thus broadened into a concept of peacebuilding, which dates back to the post-World War II reconstruction of Europe and Japan. The term 'peacebuilding' entered the international lexicons in the early 1990s when the then United Nations Secretary General Boutros- Boutros Ghali defined it in his 1992 *Agenda for Peace* as "...Action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict".² The follow-up documents, such as the 1995 *Supplement to the Agenda for Peace*³, while the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (the so called 'Brahimi Report') further elaborated and expanded the concept of peacebuilding to mean inte-

grated approaches to addressing violent conflicts in different phases of the conflict cycle.⁴

In contemporary "hybrid" peacebuilding operations (in which elements from the United Nations and a regional organization are deployed as part of the same mission under joint leadership)⁵, a variety of external and internal actors, including international, regional and sub-regional organizations and mechanisms, international financial institutions, international NGOs, national development and relief agencies, donors, national and sub-national actors as well as local communities, take part in joint efforts to strengthen peace in post-conflict countries. Such a comprehensive approach has significantly increased the number of civilian, police and military personnel serving in different peace operations, as shown in the table below:⁶

- 1 Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse Tom and Miall Hugh, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 3rd ed., (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005), pp. 134-150.
- 2 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. UN document, (New York: United Nations, 1992)
- 3 Ibid.

- 4 The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, (New York: United Nations, 2000).
- 5 United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping – Principles and Guidelines* (New York: United Nations, 2008).
- 6 Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), 10/2014, *International and German Personnel in Peace Operations 2014-2015*; at <http://www.zif-berlin.org> (*Due to constant change in the number of personnel, provided numbers represent only a snapshot)

TOTAL PERSONELL IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS				
Mision Type	International Personnel			
	Military	Police	Civilian	Total
UN Peacekeeping Operations	85.854	12.028	5.202	103.084
UN Politicl and Peacebuilding Missions	296	26	1.097	1.419
EU Missions	3.205	993	906	5.104
OSCE Missions	0	0	885	885
NATO Missions	54.784	0	0	54.784
African Regional Organizations	25.374	796	50	26.220
Others	5.659	179	59	5.897
Total	175.172	14.022	8.199	197.393



Furthermore, post-conflict peacebuilding requires a remarkable range of civilian expertise in order to carry out activities related to the security, political and socio-economic reconstruction of war-torn societies, which is critical for the overall success of the peace process in any mission.⁷

With growing demands for employment of civil experts on peace missions (which in the case of UN has doubled in the last decade), this policy brief aims to provide an overview of operational requirements, legal frameworks, practices and challenges in relation to the deployment of civilian experts to UN, EU, OSCE and NATO peace operations.

The UN Efforts to Improve Civilian Capacities in Peace Operations

The UN efforts to improve civilian capacities in peace operations while demands for deployment of civilian expertise in the UN peace operations grew during the past two decades was addressed for the first time in a systematic way in the 2009 *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*. In the Report, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stressed that

- *“the immediate post-conflict period offers a window of opportunity to provide basic security, deliver peace dividends, shore up and build confidence in the political process, and strengthen core national capacity to lead peacebuilding efforts thereby beginning to lay the foundations for sustainable development.”*⁸

However, he concluded, in too many cases the UN failed and missed this early opportunity to act with appropriate capacities, including lack of adequate civilian expertise. The Report also urged Member States and regional organizations to act coherently towards achieving the common goals by deploying necessary capabilities to address operational tasks in the following areas: a) support to basic safety and security, b) support to political processes, c) support to the provision of basic services, d) support to restoring core government functions, and e) support to economic revitalization.⁹ After the publication of this Report, in 2010 the Secretary General entrusted the Senior Advisory Group with the task of analyzing how the UN and international organizations could increase the number of civilian experts deployed in peace operations.

In its *Report on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict*, the Senior Advisory Group recommended that deployment of civilian capacities by Member States and international organizations be based on the OPEN concept (*Ownership, Partnership, Expertise and Nimbleness*), meaning that (local) national ownership over the peacebuilding process should be strengthened by supporting core government functions, that the UN should generate civilian capacities through global partnerships, that the UN should draw on external capacities from Member States and regional organizations, and that the use of available resources should be effective and efficient.¹⁰

Based on its analysis of each core area mentioned in the *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, the Senior Advisory Group identified a number of capacity gaps that should be addressed by the UN through the OPEN concept. The identified critical capacity gaps are:¹¹

Based on the UN initiative to strengthen civilian capacities in peace operations, a number of subsequent mechanisms and projects were launched in order to increase effectiveness and efficiency in relation to recruitment and deployment of civilian expertise in peace operations. One of these mechanisms was the Civilian Capacity Initiative (CIVCAP) established in 2012, which was one of the initial UN efforts to ensure stronger civilian expert support to peace processes in post-conflict countries.¹²

However, even though the Senior Advisory Group has identified the critical capacity gaps in its Report, suggesting that they be filled with available civilian resources existing in the UN and recommending fostering a culture of global service provision, a number of national and UN-related issues and challenges remain to be resolved before the CIVCAP concept becomes truly operationally effective. Furthermore, the number of civilians deployed in peace operations has doubled during the last ten years, from 9,325 civilians deployed in 13 UN missions (in 2004)¹³ to 16,791 civilians (as of 30 June 2015) deployed in 16 UN missions.¹⁴ Issues related to the clarity of the CIVCAP concept, recruitment, selection and deployment of civilian experts were identified in the *Synthesis Report of the Baseline Study on Civilian Capacity*, published by the CIVCAP Network in

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Senior Advisory Group, *Report on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict* (New York: United Nations, 2010).

11 Ibid.

12 More info on CIVCAP at <http://www.civcapreview.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3734&language=en-US>

13 The UN Peacekeeping Fact Sheet at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet_archive.shtml

14 The UN Peacekeeping Fact Sheet at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml>



CORE TASKS IN THE AFTERMATH OF CONFLICT: CLUSTERS AND SUBCLUSTERS OF ACTIVITY				
Basic safety and security	Inclusive political processes	Basic services	Core government functionality	Economic revitalization
Basic safety and security	Inclusive political process	Humanitarian activities	Core government functionality	Economic revitalization
Community violence reduction	Constitutional processes	Agriculture	Aid policy and coordination	Employment generation
Disarmament and demobilization	Elections and electoral processes	Camp coordination, camp management	Anti-corruption	Natural resource management
Mine action	Mediation, good offices and conflict resolution	Education	Executive branch	Private sector and industrial development
Police	Support to civil society	Early recovery	Legislative branch	Public works and infrastructure
Protection of civilians	Political party development	Emergency shelter	Local governance	
Security sector reform and governance	Public information and media	Health	Public administration reform	
Transnational crime/ counter-terrorism		Nutrition	Public financial management	
Justice		Protection	Urban planning	
Corrections		Water, sanitation and hygiene		
Criminal justice				
Judicial and legal reform				
Transitional justice				
Capacity development				
Gender				
Human Rights				

2013 (conducted, through case studies, for: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey – known as the block of Global South countries).¹⁵ Some observations and recommendations applicable to CIVCAP concept in general, offered in the CIVCAP’s Network Report, also happen to be worth mentioning. First of all, the Report calls for moving the CIVCAP concept from the theoretical to a more practical sphere by urging the UN to provide more accurate information on the exact type of required civilian expertise as well as its duration. Second, the Report indicates an unclear situation concerning the arrangements under which civilian Government-provided personnel (GPP) could be deployed to the UN missions. Finally, the Report suggests that the UN shift from its direct recruitment model (by employing individuals from any country) to a model which provides GPP through official national channels, thus enabling proper national planning, preparation and representation within the CIVCAP concept.¹⁶ In addition,

in his Policy Report¹⁷ Cedric de Coning points out that the main problem for the UN is not the lack of available civilian expertise offered through the direct model of employment, but rather the handling of too many applications and the overly complicated and much too lengthy process of recruitment of personnel which slows down the deployment of civilian expertise into the field missions, leaving the capability gap which should be filled with appropriate civil professional open for too long.

Similarly, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), established by the UN Secretary General in October 2014 to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the state of the United Nations peace operations, pointed out in its Report that “...United Nations administrative procedures, particularly in the field of human resources, are failing missions and their mandates.”¹⁸ Furthermore, the same Report stressed that

15 Civilian Capacity Network, *The Synthesis Report of the Baseline Study on Civilian Capacity* (Oslo:Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2013)

16 Ibid.

17 Cedric de Coning, *Civilian Capacity in United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Mission (Capacity)* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2010).

18 “Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people” p. 15, (New York: United Nations, 2015) at http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf



- *“the Panel has heard widespread concerns about United Nations human resources management... Existing procedures for recruiting staff and bringing them on board are onerous and slow. Tools for accelerating recruitment, such as rosters, have not delivered sufficient results; they work only when quality candidates are on the roster and are willing and able to deploy. In operating environments that demand more tailored and more flexible United Nations peace operations, it appears that human resources policies may be moving in the opposite direction.”¹⁹*

Calling for a more comprehensive approach to peace operations, the Panel has recommended embracing the new terminology such as “United Nations peace operations” that would “...Denote the full spectrum of United Nations peace and security missions and initiatives...as well as more flexible tools and instruments, such as the use of small teams of experts and peace and development advisers deployed jointly by the United Nations Development Programme and the Department of Political Affairs to support national Governments and United Nations country teams.”²⁰ In addition, the Panel has identified a number of shortfalls in relation to the timely and effective reaction and deployment to peace operations, suggesting that

- *“the United Nations should be able to deploy an integrated civilian, military and police headquarters capacity, to be fully functional within, at most, 8 to 12 weeks of mandate authorization. As required, such capacity should include senior mission leaders, military and police command and planning staff, and civilian capacity, including political, human rights, logistics and administrative personnel...”²¹*

Based on the identified operational requirements and human resources management in peace operations, in the same Report the Panel has come up with a number of suggestions for the improvements in these areas, such as that:

- *„A significant strengthening of and more reliable resourcing through the regular budget for the Secretariat’s core prevention and mediation capacities, including monitoring and analysis, support to the Secretary-General’s good offices and mediation support, including the standby mediation team and the deployment of peace and development advisers and small multidisciplinary teams of experts to support the United Nations country team when needed...”²²*

- *“That heads of missions should have greater authority to move personnel within the mission to meet changing demands as they arise. Peace operations also need the flexibility to bring on board for a specified period, and then release, individuals with specific skills and experiences relevant to a particular mandate or situation”²³*
- *“The Department of Field Support should be empowered to develop specific human resources and other administrative procedures for field missions to facilitate more rapid deployment and tailored management of civilian staff, with appropriate delegation of authorities to heads of missions to better manage the reassignment of personnel within their missions.”²⁴*

In short, we can conclude that the UN has recognized the need to deploy and integrate civilian capacities in the field missions, and has also improved its theoretical and policy frameworks in relation to CIVCAP. However, practice shows that the work is not finished and that CIVCAP and CAPMATCH need to be further improved to enable CIVCAP providers to plan and deploy appropriate civilian expertise to UN peace operations.

The OSCE and CIVCAP Efforts

Until the end of the Cold War, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was operating mainly in forums and series of meetings and conferences of its Member States. However, with the geopolitical changes in Europe after the Cold War and the new approach to security, the OSCE has developed mechanisms that enable a comprehensive approach to security, encompassing political-military, economic and environmental, as well as human aspects.²⁵ The new approach to security issues required deployment and employment of different expertise – military, police and civilian. OSCE currently employs more than 2,500 people in 22 different offices and missions.²⁶

Employment with OSCE is regulated by the internal regulations on General Conditions for Employment and the OSCE Code of Conduct.²⁷ As per General Conditions for Employment, OSCE distinguishes between two types of employed personnel - Staff and Mission members. Staff members are employed in the OSCE Secretariat and its different institutions as: the International Contracted (employed and appo-

19 Ibid, p. 95

20 Ibid, p 28

21 *“Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people”* p. 64, (New York: United Nations, 2015) at http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf

22 Ibid, p 36

23 Ibid, p. 95

24 Ibid, p. 96

25 More about OSCE see at <http://www.osce.org>

26 Employment in OSCE at <http://www.osce.org/employment> accessed on 05 Mar 2016

27 Ibid.



inted by OSCE), the International Seconded (employed by and appointed to OSCE by a Member State), and the General Service Staff (local nationals employed and appointed by OSCE). The Mission members are deployed to field missions in a similar way: as the International Contracted (employed and appointed by OSCE), the International Seconded (employed by and appointed to OSCE by a Member State), and the National Professional and General Service Staff (local nationals employed and appointed by OSCE).

While the policy framework for employment and deployment of CIVCAP in OSCE is in place and serves its purpose, in their *Report on the Future of OSCE Field Operations*²⁸ the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions calls on Member States to make a greater contribution to OSCE field missions; improve their selection criteria for personnel seconded to OSCE, and urges the States to provide adequate vocational training for the personnel prior to their deployment to OSCE missions. In addition, the Report suggests that the OSCE should pay more attention to competencies of locally hired staff members, observe UN SCR 1325 on gender equality and the mainstreaming and inclusion of women, and urges OSCE to establish a Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Fund as a reserve fund for responding to crisis situations.²⁹

The OSCE has made quite a progress with its development of policy documents for employment/deployment of CIVCAP. However, with its 57 Member States and the number and scope of current field offices and missions it has been running, OSCE seems rather understaffed (the overall number of employed personnel, which is mainly civilian, is approximately 20% of the number of civilians employed by the UN). This represents an operational challenge and could lead to a lack of effectiveness that might threaten the operational success of its field missions.

The Deployment of CIVCAP to EU-Led Peace Operations

Development of civilian capacities to EU peace operations has long been viewed as crucial to the success of the broader European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and is guided by the Civilian Headline Goals. The first Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) was put forth in 2000 by the European Council, identifying policing, the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection as four priority areas for the

EU.³⁰ Subsequently, the CHG 2008, which was introduced in 2004, expanded the previously introduced CHG by adding two new priority areas: monitoring of the missions and support for EU Special Representatives. The CHG 2008 also emphasized the need for the Union to conduct simultaneous missions and highlighted two further focus areas for the EU: security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR).³¹ The policy framework of EU CIVCAP was further broadened through the introduction of CHG 2010, which placed greater emphasis on civilian-military cooperation in addition to the continued focus on improving readiness and deployability. The CHG 2010 also called for making available 285 additional experts on transitional justice, dialogue, and conflict analysis. Furthermore, the CHG 2010 also focused on the creation of Civilian Response Teams (CRT), a 100-person strong pool of experts ready for rapid deployment.³²

EU manages 16 peace missions with more than 2,000 civilian personnel (as October 2015),³³ of which 11 are civilian missions. Looking into comparative advantages of having EU CIVCAP in peace missions (despite all the difficulties and challenges facing the current missions, which will be discussed in the following paragraph), in his RAND analysis for the US MoD, Christopher S. Chivvis pointed out that one of the main advantages of EU's CIVCAP in missions is the greater aggregation of resources, stressing that *"In cases where needs are large or no single state is inclined to send staff in large numbers, this power of aggregation is significant, and it increases the chances that a civilian mission will be deployed"*.³⁴ However, this might be true on a case by case basis, but it is not a rule that all the missions with a shortage of resources that member states were supposed to provide could be covered by the EU aggregated resources. This was confirmed in the study conducted by Giji Gya, who found that *"...Even though there are some 1.6 million EU civilian personnel available, only 5,000 are pledged and some 2,000 deployed because of competing demands, often at home in Europe"*.³⁵ It should be mentioned that EU pe-

28 OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, *Report on the Future of OSCE Field Operations*, (Vienna, 2014)

29 Ibid.

30 European Council Meeting Conclusions at <http://www.bits.de/CESD-PA/24-e-f.html> (European Council, 2000).

31 EU Civilian Headline Goal 2008 at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015863%202004%20INIT>

32 EU Civilian Headline Goal 2010 at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Civilian_Headline_Goal_2010.pdf

33 Publication *Impetus* at http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eu-military-staff/documents/impetus_n18.pdf (EUMS, 2014)

34 Christopher S. Chivvis, *EU Civilian Crisis Management - The Record So Far* (USA: RAND, 2009)

35 Giji Gya, *Tapping the Human Dimension: Civilian Capabilities in ESDP*(2009) at http://www.esdpm.org/pdf/2009_escg_22_isis-briefing-note-2009-1-civ-capabilities.pdf



peace missions have also been opened to non-EU countries, which could serve both as an incentive for CIVCAP contributing agencies to take a part in the EU missions, but also for EU to bridge its own CIVCAP capability gap.

When it comes to EU CIVCAP, we can conclude that the EU has made great developmental strides in terms of CIVCAP in theoretical as well as practical sphere since its inception in 2000. However, the identified problem of shortage of CIVCAP could be overcome through bi- or multilateral arrangements with non-EU countries or other CIVCAP providers.

NATO and CIVCAP in Peace Operations

Besides permanent NATO civilian staff, which is employed under The Civilian Personnel Regulations (CPRs) and the Code of Conduct,³⁶ NATO also offers opportunities for internships, temporary staff, or freelance interpreter assignments. A copy of the CPRs is provided to each staff member who joins the International Staff of NATO.

The aim of the Internship Program is to provide a small number of current or recent students with the opportunity to intern with the International Staff at the **NATO Headquarters in Brussels** and a few other NATO bodies. There are two types of Internship opportunities with the Alliance: the NATO-Funded and the GRANT-funded Internship Program. The former provides opportunities to a wide range of candidates, while the latter is open to those whose work is supported from the outside sources. Internships last for six months.³⁷ When it comes to temporary staff at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, NATO offers short term assignments to nationals of NATO Member States in the areas such as diplomacy, policy development, management, public affairs, project management, IT, secretarial and administrative support, and technical and maintenance work. These however are located in Brussels and require **security clearance**.³⁸ The NATO Interpretation Service employs approximately 40 staff interpreters and a number of freelance interpreters from various NATO Member States, providing interpretation in both official NATO languages: English and French.³⁹

36 NATO Civilian Personnel Regulations (CPRs) and Code of conduct at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/86790.htm>

37 NATO Internship Program at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/71157.htm>

38 NATO Temporary Staff at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/86784.htm>

39 The NATO Interpretation Service at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/86888.htm>

While NATO has a long tradition of employing civilian experts at the level of its strategic and operational Headquarters, operational needs to deploy CIVCAP came with complex peace missions in Kosovo and especially those in Afghanistan. These stabilization and peacebuilding missions triggered discussions on the concept of Comprehensive Approach to increase participation of civilian agencies in peacebuilding processes and synchronize the efforts of all actors (international, governmental-military, police, civilian and non-governmental) engaged in such peace missions in order to achieve the common goal. While the concept of Comprehensive Approach was adapted at the Riga and Bucharest Summits, it remained rather limited (due to the objection filed by France)⁴⁰ in terms of development of NATO organic CIVCAP, and gave priority to provision of CIVCAP through national contribution.⁴¹ However, even before the concept of Comprehensive Approach was adapted, some NATO nations increased their presence of CIVCAP in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan through establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).

The first teams were established under the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in early 2003, and within three years, under the NATO ISAF mandate, the PRT network grew to 25 PRTs that are now present throughout Afghanistan, each of them responsible for the reconstruction and stabilization of a province in which they are located.⁴² Since there was no unified approach as to how a PRT should be structured, configured and manned across ISAF, such PRTs were solely nationally funded and run, with NATO playing the role of coordinator. In general, PRTs consisted of military troops charged with protection, while CIVCAP consisted of civilian experts coming from the Ministries of the interior, economical development and foreign affairs as well as from NGOs, their numbers ranging from a couple of advisors to up to a couple of dozen people, depending on the nation.⁴³ Particularly interesting are the cases where PRTs were joint ventures of several nations, such as PRT Chaghcharan in the Western Region, where a Lithuanian-led PRT was supported by civilians from five countries – Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Lithuania and the United

40 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *NATO's comprehensive approach to crisis response operations: a work in slow progress*, (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008)

41 Declarations from Riga and Bucharest Summit at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts.htm

42 NATO, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan – how they arrived and where they are going at* <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue3/english/art2.html>

43 Oskari Eronen, *PRT Models in Afghanistan: Approaches to Civil-Military Integration* (CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies, 2008)



States.⁴⁴ This model is relevant for smaller NATO partner nations as they can use it to provide a contribution to NATO and build their own CIVCAP pools of experts.

In conclusion, NATO remained loyal to its pre-Comprehensive Approach policy - employment of civilian experts for its strategic and operational headquarters on a permanent or temporary basis, directly through individual contracts - while specialized CIVCAP teams, as contributions to the field missions, remained a national responsibility. The possibility to have joint/combined CIVCAP teams in NATO missions provides an opportunity for smaller NATO partner nations to provide their own contributions to NATO and thus develop their own CIVCAP capacities.

Summary of Findings

The growing demand for employment of civilian capacities in peace missions has been recognized and given high priority by the UN, OSCE, EU and NATO.

First of all, even though the UN has identified the need for civilian capacities to be deployed and integrated in the field missions, and improved its theoretical and policy framework in relation to civilian capacities, the practice shows that the job is not finished and that civilian capacities and CAPMATCH still need to be improved in order to enable civilian capacities providers to plan and deploy appropriate civilian expertise to UN peace operations.

Second, when it comes to OSCE we have found that it has made quite a progress regarding its development of policy documents for employment/deployment of civilian capacities. However, with 57 Member States and the number

and scope of current field offices and missions it has been running, OSCE seems rather understaffed, which represents an operational challenge and could lead to a lack of effectiveness that might threaten the operational success of its field missions.

With regard to EU civilian capacities, there have been some great developments in the EU in terms of civilian capacities, in the theoretical as well as practical sphere since its inception in 2000. The identified problem of shortage of civilian capacities could be overcome through bi- or multilateral arrangements with non-EU countries or other civilian capacities providers.

In the case of NATO, we have found that this organization is focused on the employment of civilian experts for its strategic and operational headquarters on a permanent or temporary basis, directly through individual contracts, while specialized civilian capacities teams remain national responsibilities as contributions to field missions. The possibility to have joint/combined civilian capacities teams in NATO missions offers an opportunity to smaller NATO partner nations to provide a contribution to NATO and simultaneously develop their own civilian capacities.

In conclusion, the study established that, despite the fact that all the organizations have developed policy their frameworks, there is still the need in the UN for further development of the practical application of civilian capacities in terms of recruitment, selection, deployment, availability and operational conduct. These are the areas that require a closer look and solutions for improvement in order to support generation of desired effects that may be gained by deployment of civilian capacities in future peace operations.

⁴⁴ Almantas Leika, *Operational and Strategic Lessons Learned from Running a PRT* (Tartu: Baltic Defence College, 2008)



ABOUT AUTHOR

Denis HADZOVIC holds a PhD in Security and Peace Studies from the Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo. He is one of the founders and the Secretary General of Centre for Security Studies (CSS). He has been an editor of several books, studies and has successfully implemented multiple research projects. He is the author of multiple research papers and studies in the field of euro-atlantic integrations, human security, democratic values in the security sector and post-conflict transition, and has participated in multiple international and local scientific and expert conferences.



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ABOUT PROJECT

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) is conducting three-year project with the aim to support capacity development of the Western Balkans states to roster, train and deploy civilian capacities to peace operations. This three-year project is funded by the by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and implemented by regional partners from Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

